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 Abstract 
In 1993, Czechoslovakia experienced a two-fold break-up: On January 1, the country 
disintegrated as a political union, while preserving an economic and monetary union. Then, the 
Czech-Slovak monetary union collapsed on February 8. We analyze the economic background 
of the two break-ups, and discuss lessons for the stability of monetary unions in general. We 
argue that Czechoslovakia fulfilled some of the optimum currency area criteria, however, given 
the low correlation of permanent shocks, it appears it was relatively less integrated than some 
other existing unions. That, along with low labor mobility and a higher concentration of heavy 
and military industries in Slovakia, made the Czechoslovak economy vulnerable to asymmetric 
economic shocks—such as those induced by the economic transition. Furthermore, the 
Czech-Slovak monetary union was marred by low credibility, lack of political commitment, low 
exit costs, and the absence of fiscal transfers.  
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1. Introduction 
In 1993, Czechoslovakia experienced two-fold break-up: On January 1, the country 
disintegrated as a political union of the Czech and Slovak Republics, while preserving an 
economic and monetary union. Then, the Czech-Slovak monetary union collapsed on February 
8.  
In the paper at hand, we analyze these two Czechoslovak break-ups and attempt to draw from 
them implications for the stability of monetary unions. Our main aim is not to explain the failure 
of Czechoslovakia as a political union. We believe this can be (and has been) better answered 
by political scientists. We focus rather at the economic reasons underlying the collapse of the 
Czech-Slovak monetary union (CSMU).  
The demise of Czechoslovakia is most often explained by the political deadlock following the 
1992 general election—see, for example, Batt (1993), Wolchik (1995), and Stranger (1996).
 
Economic factors are often attributed only a minor role in causing the break-up. Dedek et al. 
(1996) describe the economic background of Czechoslovakia’s disintegration and emphasize 
that the two economies converged rather than diverged, at least after the WWII. They see 
political motives as the culprits for the break-up. Capek and Sazama (1993) and Pavlinek 
(1995) blame the differences in attitudes toward economic reforms for the break-up. On the one 
hand, the Czechs associated socialism with stagnation and/or deterioration of their standard of 
living. On the other hand, the Slovaks saw socialism as a period of rapid growth and catching 
up with the richer Czech Lands. As a result, they argue, there was a much stronger resistance 
toward economic reforms in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.
1
 Sociologists, in turn, point 
to the social and demographic differences between the two nations. However, as Musil (1995) 
suggests “the two societies, at the time of the split, had substantially more in common than 
they had at the time of Czechoslovakia’s formation.” 
The failure to establish a single Czechoslovakian identity is often emphasized, especially by 
Czech and Slovak scholars. According to Rychlik (1995, p.97), “the reasons for the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia must be sought in the principles of the development of the modern nation, i.e. 
in the process of the formation of a separate national awareness of Czechs and Slovaks.” He is 
also of the opinion that economic aspects played a minor role. In particular, he suggests (p. 
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104) that the Slovak nationalists considered political independence of Slovakia “an absolute 
value in itself for which no economic prosperity could compensate.” Similarly, Musil (1995, p. 2) 
argues that “in the history of Czechoslovakia’s disintegration, the key role was played by the 
differences in conceptions and opinions concerning the division of powers between Czech and 
Slovak political institutions. […] In spite of extensive efforts by politicians and intellectuals in 
the inter-war period and partly also after the Second World War, the idea of a common 
Czechoslovak state did not put down deep roots in Slovak soil.”  
As this brief survey suggests, economic factors of the break-up of Czechoslovakia and 
subsequently the Czech-Slovak monetary union have not received much attention in the 
literature. Nevertheless, we believe there are important lessons to be learned from the two-fold 
break-up of Czechoslovakia, in particular in the context of analyzing the stability of other 
monetary arrangements—such as the EMU.  
This paper seeks to contribute to the growing body of literature on integration and disintegration 
of countries. Our line of reasoning is mainly based on the theory of optimum currency areas 
(OCA). Started by the seminal contribution of Mundell (1961) (see also McKinnon (1963) and 
Kenen (1969)), this field has become particularly popular for analyses of the costs and benefits 
of monetary integration, in particular with  reference to the EMU. The basic point of the OCA 
theory is that countries or regions which are exposed to symmetric shocks or which posses 
mechanisms for the absorption of asymmetric shocks may find it optimal to adopt a common 
currency. This literature therefore focuses on assessing the symmetry of output shocks in 
monetary unions and/or on evaluating the absorption mechanisms—such as labor mobility, or 
fiscal transfers.  
The importance of output shocks is also emphasized by Fidrmuc (1999b), who explores the 
incentives for (dis)integration in a political economy model of a union with a centralized fiscal 
policy. He argues that the stability of integration depends not only on the correlation (or 
symmetry) of shocks but also on their persistence.  
Inasmuch as we deliver judgment about the design flaws of the CSMU, our paper also relates 
to the literature concerned with the institutional set-up of unions. Again, the EMU is at the 
center of attention in this literature: Cukierman (1995), Hughes Hallett, Vines and Anthony 
                                                                                                                                          
1 While this explanation for differences in support for reforms is quite plausible, Fidrmuc (1999a) links 
electoral support for reforms to costs and benefits of the reforms. In particular, higher unemployment and lower 
entrepreneurial activity in Slovakia made the reforms less popular there compared to the Czech Republic.  
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(1993) and Von Hagen and Suppel (1994) are concerned with the credibility and independence 
of the European Central Bank. Fatás (1998) and Von Hagen and Hammond (1998) discuss the 
need for fiscal transfer mechanisms in the EMU and with adverse effects of asymmetric 
shocks.  
Empirical literature on disintegration, however, is very limited. Dornbusch (1992), Garber and 
Spencer (1994) and Cheikbossian (1995) look at the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and draw lessons for the then ongoing break-up of the Soviet Empire and currency reforms. 
Cohen (1993) looks at the sustainability of monetary unions using a comparative analysis of 
six historical examples of monetary integration: the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, the 
CFA Franc Zone, the East Caribbean Currency Area, the East African Community, the Latin 
Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union. He discusses economic, organizational 
and political factors and identifies the last group as “most instrumental in determining the 
sustainability of monetary cooperation among sovereign governments.”  
Indeed, it is recognized in the literature that political factors play a crucial role in creating and 
sustaining monetary unions, see for example Goodhart (1995). According to Machlup (1977, 
p.71): “What ultimately counts, however, is that all members are willing to give up their 
independence in matters of money, credit and interest. Pragmatically, therefore, an optimum 
currency area is a region no part of which insists on creating money and having a monetary 
policy of its own.”  
In the present paper, we analyze the two-fold Czechoslovak break-up and draw implications for 
the stability of monetary unions. Our aim is to identify which economic factors contributed to 
the failure of the Czech-Slovak Monetary Union. If the political disintegration of Czechoslovakia 
was indeed caused solely by political factors, then there was little rationale for abandoning the 
common currency. Political objectives of the two nations could have been realized while 
retaining the monetary union. The fact that the common currency did not last for more than five 
weeks suggests that there may have been deeper economic reasons for the break-up.  
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we describe the events leading to and accompanying the 
two-fold break-up of Czechoslovakia and the Czech-Slovak Monetary Union. In Section 3, we 
start by briefly discussing the implication of the OCA theory for the stability of integration and 
then apply the criteria of the OCA literature to identify economic factors underlying the break-up 
of Czechoslovakia. In Section 4, we discuss the benefits and costs of the break-up inflicted on  
the successor countries. Finally, in the last Section we derive some conclusions for other 
monetary unions.  
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2. The Two-Fold Break-up of Czechoslovakia  
The split of Czechoslovakia occurred as a consequence of the parliamentary election in June 
1992. In the Czech Republic, a coalition of three right-of-center parties won whereas a left-wing 
nationalist party won in Slovakia. It soon became clear that the two sides were unable—or 
unwilling—to form a joint federal government. The main points of conflict were the redistribution 
of power between the federation and the constituent republics and the design of further reforms. 
Eventually, the Czechs and Slovaks agreed to disagree—by deciding to dismantle the 
federation and create two independent countries on January 1, 1993, only half a year after the 
elections.  
To mitigate the economic effects of the split, the Czech Republic and Slovakia retained their 
common currency, a customs union and a common labor market. While the customs union 
and the freedom of movement of labor were intended to remain in place indefinitely, the 
monetary union was conceived as a temporary measure. Nevertheless, the two sides agreed to 
retain it at least for the first six months of 1993 and then consider further extensions. However, 
either side had a chance to withdraw from the union in case: (1) the fiscal deficit of either 
republic exceeded 10 percent of the budget revenues; (2) the foreign exchange reserves of 
either republic fell below one month’s worth of its imports; (3) the inter-republic capital transfers 
exceeded 5 percent of total bank deposits; and (4) the Monetary Committee (see below) could 
not reach an agreement on fundamental monetary-policy issues.  
The State Bank of Czechoslovakia (SBCS) ceased to exist with the demise of the federation, 
and thus both republics established their own central banks. For the duration of the monetary 
union, the so-called Monetary Committee was charged with determining monetary policy. The 
governors, as well as two senior officials from each central bank were members of the 
Committee and monetary policy was decided upon by simple majority vote. The policies were 
then to be implemented jointly by both central banks in accord with the decisions of the 
Monetary Committee. 
It soon became clear, however, that the ensuing monetary union would not enjoy much 
credibility. Foreign exchange reserves had already declined substantially in November and 
December 1992 and continued to decline throughout January. After the two currencies had 
been separated in the second week of February, the foreign reserves of the Czech National 
Bank (CNB) rebounded. In Slovakia, however, the decline continued until the National Bank of 
Slovakia (NBS) devalued the currency by 10% in July 1993.  
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Lack of credibility was also evident in the evolution of the parallel exchange rate of the CSK 
(i.e. exchange rate quoted by foreign commercial banks). According to Prokop (1994, p.46), 
the parallel rate climbed to 51.56 CSK per dollar—78 percent more than the official exchange 
rate. Moreover, foreign banks simply ceased trading in CSK around mid January and did not 
start trading in the successor currencies until March 1993.  
During late 1992 and throughout January 1993, it became evident that many Slovak residents 
and firms transferred funds to Czech commercial banks in expectation of a Slovak devaluation 
shortly after the split. Further, Czech exports to Slovakia shot up substantially toward the end 
of 1992. Compared to the last quarter of 1991, Czech exports to Slovakia rose by 25 percent in 
the last quarter of 1992. On the other hand, while Slovak exports to the Czech Republic also 
increased, it was only by 16 percent. Moreover, in expectation of a future devaluation of the 
Slovak currency, Slovak importers sought to repay their debts as soon as possible while Czech 
importers did exactly the opposite—see Prokop (1994) and Smidkova (1994). All these 
developments led to a gradual outflow of currency from Slovakia to the Czech Republic. The 
SBCS, and later the CNB, attempted to balance this outflow by credits to Slovak banks which 
became increasingly difficult in December 1992 and January 1993. Therefore, the Czech 
government and the CNB decided as early as on January 19, 1993 to separate the currency 
(Prokop, 1994). After secret negotiations with the Slovak side, the separation date was set as 
February 8, 1993, and the Czech-Slovak Monetary Union ceased to exist less than six weeks 
after the break-up of Czechoslovakia. 
Monetary separation was publicly announced on February 2. Starting with February 3, all 
payments between the two republics stopped and border controls were increased to prevent 
transfers of cash from one country to the other. During the separation period between February 
4-7 (Thursday through Sunday), the old Czechoslovak currency was exchanged for the new 
currencies. The new currencies became valid on February 8. Regular Czechoslovak banknotes 
were used temporarily in both republics and were distinguished by a paper stamp attached to 
the face of the banknote. The public was furthermore encouraged to deposit cash in bank 
accounts prior to the separation since a person could only exchange CSK 4,000 in cash. 
Business owners were not subjected to this limit. 
2
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
2 This corresponded to some USD 140. At the time of separation, the average monthly wage was CSK 5,175 
in the Czech Republic and CSK 4,659 in Slovakia (according to OECD, 1994). Cash in excess of the limit could be 
deposited in an account with the Postbank (the actual exchange was carried out by post offices), or sent as a 
postal money transfer (to be delivered after the separation period).  
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Coins and small denomination notes (CSK 10, 20 and 50 in the Czech Republic and CSK 10 
and 20 in Slovakia) were still used for several months after the separation. Nevertheless, such 
notes and coins only accounted for some 3 percent of the currency in circulation in each state. 
On the other hand, the notes of CSK 10, 20 and 50 accounted for some 45 percent of the total 
number of banknotes. The stamped banknotes were gradually replaced by new Czech and 
Slovak banknotes. This process was finished by the end of August 1993.  
3. The Break-up of Czechoslovakia and the 
Optimum Currency Area Theory 
Issues discussed in the optimum currency area (OCA) literature had been  known for a long 
time, however Mundell’s (1961) publication was usually considered to be the first seminal 
contribution to this literature. Mundell stated the problem in its full difficulty as the search for an 
“appropriate domain of a currency area.” He and the subsequent literature discussed the 
criteria which would “define the optimum currency area, within which the exchange rates 
should be pegged immutably, but whose rates should fluctuate, or at least be varied, vis-à-vis 
the outside world” (Kenen, 1969 p. 41). In this Section we attempt to establish whether 
Czechoslovakia constituted an optimum currency area during the time of its existence. Failure 
to fulfill some of the criteria could have been the reason for the break-up or a source of tension 
preceding the break-up.  
We focus on the following criteria of the OCA literature: the symmetry of output shocks, inter-
regional labor mobility, the intensity of bilateral trade and the diversification of the industrial 
structure. We do not discuss those criteria which cannot be directly applied to the case of 
former Czechoslovakia. Particularly, due to the peculiar characteristic of the socialist economy 
there was little room for movements in nominal variables. Thus, we leave out the discussion of 
criteria such as the degree of price and wage flexibility, the degree of goods market integration 
and the similarity of inflation rates. 
3.1 Symmetry and Asymmetry of Output Shocks  
In his classic contribution, Mundell (1961) presents an example of a two-country world in which 
both countries are exposed to asymmetric demand shocks. Nominal wages are sticky in both 
countries and labor mobility between the two countries is low. In the presence of asymmetric 
shocks, the countries can adjust the exchange rate to alter the relative prices and mitigate 
adverse effects of the shocks. However, if these two countries use the same currency, country-
specific monetary policy measures are no longer possible, and thus adjustment is more costly 
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than in the previous case. This implies that if two regions are exposed to asymmetric shocks, 
they should use the adjustment potential of flexible exchange rates. On the other hand, 
adopting fixed exchange rates or a common currency may be optimal if the shocks are 
symmetric.
3
 For the purpose of this paper, it has to be stated that if the Czech Republic, as 
well as Slovakia had been exposed to asymmetric shocks, this fact would have increased 
incentives to break up. On the other hand, if the two countries had been exposed to symmetric 
shocks, this criterion would not have contributed much to understanding the break-up.  
Table 1 Correlation Coefficients of Permanent and Temporary Shocks 
A. Czech Republic and Slovakia: Permanent shocks Temporary shocks 
Net Material Product, 1948-1990 0.53 0.83 
Net Material Product, 1960-1990 0.41 0.85 
Net Material Product, 1970-1990 0.43 0.81 
Disposable Net Material Product, 1948-1990 0.34 0.42 
Disposable Net Material Product, 1960-1990 0.53 0.51 
Disposable Net Material Product, 1970-1990 0.46 0.83 
B. EMU, Germany, and the US: Permanent shocks Temporary shocks 
Germany and France1 0.54 0.35 
Germany and Belgium1 0.61 0.33 
Germany and the Netherlands1 0.59 0.17 
Germany and the United Kingdom1 0.11 0.16 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Hessen2 0.80 0.82 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria2 0.69 0.64 
Bavaria and Baden-Wurttenberg2 0.76 0.82 
Hamburg and Bremen2 0.14 -0.21 
The Mid-East and New England3 0.86 0.79 
The Mid-East and Great Lakes3 0.81 0.60 
The Mid-East and Rocky Mountains3 0.18 -0.28 
Estimated by bivariate structural vector autoregressive model, see text or Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) for 
details.  
Data Sources (Panel A): Historical Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia (1985) and Statistical Yearbook 
(various volumes), Federal Statistical Office, Prague. 
Sources (Panel B): 1 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), GDP, 1962-1988; 2 Funke (1997), GDP, 1974-1993; 3 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), GDP, 1965-1986. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
3 Melitz (1995) raises the point that Mundell’s argument is valid only in a two-country world, where giving up 
one country’s currency implies establishing a single world currency. In the  more realistic example of a three-
country world—where two countries can form a currency union and the third country stays outside the union—
Mundell’s argument is weaker.  
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How to measure the incidence of shocks is not a clear matter, since shocks are not directly 
observable. Following Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), we use a bivariate VAR model to 
decompose the variations in output into temporary and permanent shocks.
4
 The shocks are 
denoted temporary and permanent from the point of view of their effect on output, however, both 
types of shocks have permanent effects on prices. The methodology is described in great 
detail in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). Since it would take up much room, we do not 
repeat the description here. We used real and nominal output proxied by net material product 
(national income) in constant and current prices covering the period 1948-90. Panel A of Table 1 
presents the results.  
Our estimates suggest that temporary and permanent shocks affecting the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia were significantly and positively correlated. This is not surprising, as the two 
countries were integrated for most of the 20th century. Indeed, one would expect that being part 
of a single economic and monetary area and being exposed to the same or at least similar 
economic policies would cause the shocks experienced by the two countries to be highly 
correlated.  
To assess the viability of Czechoslovakia as a single currency area, it is instructive to compare 
it with other existing unions. Panel B of Table 1 reports estimates of correlation of permanent 
and temporary shocks for three such unions: the EMU, the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
the US. The correlation of permanent shocks between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is 
between 0.34 and 0.53 (for different sub-periods). This is comparable to the correlation of 
permanent shocks in the core EMU countries: Germany, France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Our estimates, however, are substantially lower than the correlation of permanent 
shocks in  the core German Federal States, or the US regions (between 0.69 and 0.86). On 
the other hand, the correlation of temporary shocks in former Czechoslovakia was relatively 
high exceeding 0.80—perhaps reflecting the strong government control over the economy.  
Hence, we find that the shocks that affected the two parts of Czechoslovakia were generally 
symmetric. Despite the fact that the Czech Republic and Slovakia were parts of a single 
political and monetary union for most of this century, the degree of economic integration in 
former Czechoslovakia was in fact lower than in  the core regions of Germany or in the US, and 
only comparable to the core members of the EU. This probably reflects the relatively high 
degree of specialization of the two economies (see Section 3.5 for further discussion) and 
hence their vulnerability to asymmetric shocks.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
4 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) call permanent shocks supply shocks and temporary shocks demand 
shocks. As Minford (1993) points out, however, this is somewhat misleading. For example, temporary shocks 
may also reflect transitory supply shocks, policy responses to shocks and exchange rate adjustments. A similar 
argument holds for the permanent shocks.  
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Clearly, the use of data originating from the period of central planning is problematic, as the 
economy was under strict control by the government and prices were not the result of market 
clearing.5 In effect, some of the shocks captured by our analysis were probably caused by 
government policies rather than by external factors. This can be regarded as a partial 
explanation for the relatively low correlation of permanent shocks discussed above. On the 
other hand, the central setting of prices may have contributed to the high correlation of 
temporary shocks—as temporary shocks in this framework are those that only affect prices 
but not output in the long run. For the interpretation of our results, this essentially implies that 
the economies of the two parts of former Czechoslovakia were relatively little integrated—as 
indicated by low correlation of permanent shocks. This was probably in part caused by 
deliberate government policies during the communist period. Such policies in effect rendered 
Czechoslovakia more fragile and susceptible to asymmetric shocks, such as those induced by 
the economic reforms implemented after 1990. Indeed, the reform-induced recession was more 
profound in Slovakia: during 1990-1992: the GDP declined by some 15% in the Czech Republic 
and by 22% in Slovakia, and the development in terms of unemployment was even much more 
asymmetric (see Section 3.3).  
Low correlation of permanent shocks is an important destabilizing factor in currency unions. 
The countries participating in a union can insure each other against the effects of temporary 
shocks, but permanent shocks require long-term adjustment (see Krugman’s (1993) story of 
Massachusetts). This adjustment can be achieved either by migration of factors of production 
or by changes in relative prices. If labor is immobile, and prices and wages inflexible, 
asymmetric permanent shocks create pressure for exchange rate adjustments. Although fiscal 
transfers also can respond to permanent transfers, they become essentially indistinguishable 
from redistribution and may become politically costly because of their ‘permanent’ nature. 
Fidrmuc (1999b) substantiates this argument theoretically in a political economy framework.  
3.2 Convergence of Per-Capita Output 
In a monetary union of two initially unequal entities, the presence of convergence can be an 
important factor for the  long-term sustainability of the union. Using GDP data for the period 
1970-1995, Estrin and Urga (1997) find only limited evidence of convergence within the former 
Soviet bloc, as well as within particular groupings of former socialist countries. They argue that 
these “results formalize the widely held perception that neither the CMEA, nor the rouble block, 
nor the former Soviet Union formed an optimal currency area or custom union.” Convergence 
was also an important political issue in former Czechoslovakia. The communist governments 
always accentuated that resources were being transferred to Slovakia in order to induce its 
catching up with the Czech Lands. We use the available data to evaluate this claim empirically.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
5 Quality and reliability of the data is another issue. However, since there are no alternative data sources for 
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Panel A of Table 2 reports the ratio of Slovak and Czech per capita output, based on different 
measures of real and nominal net material product. All measures show that the gap between 
the Czech Republic and the Slovakia decreased considerably. However, this process slowed 
down or stopped in 1980s, when the gap between the two countries even slightly increased. 
Moreover, the gap is much smaller for disposable NMP, emphasizing the importance of inter-
republic transfers.  
Table 2 Evidence for Convergence in Former Czechoslovakia 
A. Slovak NMP as a Ratio of Czech NMP 
Data Series/Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Real NMP 0.661 0.729 0.757 0.813 0.813 
Nominal NMP 0.635 0.744 0.788 0.851 0.836 
Real disposable NMP 0.756 0.787 0.903 0.932 0.909 
Nominal disposable NMP 0.811 0.799 0.776 0.812 0.864 
B. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics for the Residual in Eq. (1) 
Data Series/Period 1950-90 1970-90    
Real NMP -1.18 -2.02    
Nominal NMP -1.31 -2.36    
Real disposable NMP -2.06 -1.02    
Nominal disposable NMP -1.89 -1.45    
Data Sources (Panel A): Historical Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia (1985) and Statistical Yearbook 
(various volumes), Federal Statistical Office, Prague. 
Notes (Panel B): Critical values for the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% (10%) significance level are -
2.93 (-2.60) for the period 1950-1990; and at -3.06 (-2.65) for the period 1970-1990. The number of lags for the 
residuals was calculated using the Akaike information criterion. 
 
Next, we test for achieved convergence following Bernard and Durlauf (1991). Stochastic 
convergence in per capita output implies the following relationship:  
Yi,t = Yj,t + n i,j,t  (1) 
where n i,j,t ~ N(0, s²) is an error term. The log of per capita output in country i converges to the 
log of per capita output in country j if the error term n i,j,t is stationary in levels. The results of the 
test for presence of a unit root in the error term yielded by equation (1) are presented in Panel 
B of Table 2. Based on the results, we can reject the presence of achieved stochastic 
                                                                                                                                          
the period under consideration, we have to use the data that are available.  
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convergence in the sense of Bernard and Durlauf (1991). Accordingly then, the Czech and 
Slovak economies did not converge either from  1950 to 1990 or from 1970 to 1990, despite the 
stated objective to achieve just that. Our result stands in contrast to that of Estrin and Urga 
(1997) who find evidence of achieved convergence for the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
between  1970 and 1990 (as well as several other pairs of countries).
6
 For comparison, Bernard 
and Durlauf (1991) reject convergence at the five per cent level for most of the tested countries 
except for a small number of core Western European countries.  
3.3 Inter-Regional Labor Mobility 
Essentially, labor mobility substitutes for the absence of an autonomous monetary policy in a 
monetary union: unemployed workers migrate from regions hit by an adverse shock to regions 
with more favorable conditions, thus equilibrating the effects of asymmetric shocks. In a 
hypothetical union with perfect factor mobility, regions would adjust to asymmetric shocks 
immediately. When labor mobility is low and prices and wages rigid, effects of asymmetric 
shocks are persistent and unions have to rely on other mechanisms, such as fiscal transfers, 
to absorb them. Accordingly, it is often argued that the viability of the EMU can be endangered 
by a low degree of labor mobility within and across member countries—see, for example, 
Eichengreen (1993, 1998) and Puhani (1999). Similarly, if labor mobility had been low in former 
Czechoslovakia, this could have contributed to economic tensions that eventually led to the 
demise of the CSMU.  
There were little if any cultural, religious or linguistic barriers to labor mobility in former 
Czechoslovakia, and there were no legal restrictions on migration across the Czech-Slovak 
border. This has not changed after the break-up of Czechoslovakia as the two new countries 
agreed to preserve the common labor market indefinitely. Yet, the differences in unemployment 
rates were substantial and pervasive. In December 1992, the average unemployment rate 
reached 10.4 percent in Slovakia and 2.6 percent in the Czech Republic. In December 1993, in 
the wake of the break-up the unemployment rate was even higher, reaching 14.4 percent in 
Slovakia and 3.5 percent in the Czech Republic. Regional differences in unemployment were 
still more dramatic, with the minimum and maximum regional unemployment rates accounting 
for 0.3 and 6 percent in the Czech Republic in December 1992 (0.3 and 8.7 percent in 
December 1993), and 3.8 and 19.3 percent in Slovakia in December 1992 (4.5 and 26.4 
percent in December 1993). This pattern of regional distribution of unemployment suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
6 The reason is perhaps that they use a different data source (they use data reported by the World Bank 
whereas we use data reported by the Czechoslovak Statistical Office) or data transformation (they deflate the 
data to 1987 constant prices and convert them to US dollars using the commercial exchange rate). 
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 on labor mobility in former Czechoslovakia reveal that the Czechs were more 
mobile than the Slovaks—in 1990, internal migration amounted to 1.57 and 0.94 percent of the 
Czech and Slovak populations, respectively. On the other hand, the Slovaks were more likely 
to migrate across the internal border—0.07 percent of the Czechs and 0.19 percent of the 
Slovaks migrated across the Czech-Slovak border in that year. Eichengreen (1998) reports that 
internal migration amounted to 1.1 percent in the UK and in Germany and 0.6 percent in Italy. 
However, these figures refer to substantially larger regions than the Czech and Slovak districts. 
For comparison, 0.69 percent of the Czechs and 0.34 percent of the Slovaks moved across the 
boundaries of administrative regions
8
 in 1990 (these figures are already included in those on 
inter-regional  migration reported above). Accordingly, labor mobility in former Czechoslovakia 
appears relatively low when compared with Western Europe.  
Despite the pervasive regional disparities in unemployment rates, labor mobility actually 
declined during the course of economic transition. Internal migration in the Czech Republic fell 
to 1.44 percent in 1992, 0.91 percent in 1994, and 0.84 percent in 1996. Slovak internal 
migration also fell, albeit more slowly, to 0.81 percent in 1992, 0.78 percent in 1994, and 0.75 
percent in 1996.
9
 Migration across the Czech-Slovak border fell too, with only 0.01 of Czechs 
and 0.06 percent of Slovaks crossing the new border in 1996.
10
 
Given the evidence pointing to increasing regional disparities in unemployment rates on the one 
hand, and falling inter-regional migration on the other hand, the efficacy of labor mobility in 
mitigating adverse the effects of asymmetric shocks appears low. To study the relationship 
between inter-regional migration and effects of asymmetric shocks, we performed a regression 
analysis of migration at regional level. The data are based on records in municipal population 
registers and therefore do not distinguish between employment-related mobility and other 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
7 Various issues of the Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia, or the Czech Republic, or Slovakia.  
8 There were 8 such regions in the Czech Republic and 4 in Slovakia, whereas there were 76 districts in 
Czech Republic and 38 in Slovakia.  
9 Several explanations can be suggested as explanation for this fall in mobility. First, the removal of (some) 
restrictions on the housing market resulted in sharp increases in rents and real estate prices. Second, commuting 
for work is probably more common now. Third, with the fall of communism, the formal requirement of reporting 
one’s change of residence is probably more often ignored now.  
10 On the other hand, some 59 thousand Slovak citizens (including commuters) were employed in the Czech 
Republic in 1995 and 72 thousand in 1996. This corresponded to 2.3 and 2.8 percent of the Slovak labor force, 
respectively. This certainly helped to alleviate the Slovak unemployment problem, with unemployment rate standing 
at 13.1 and 12.8 percent, respectively.  
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migration.
11
 The data report total migratory flows (hence we do not have the complete 
migration matrix, only the total inflow and outflow of migrants per district and year) for 76 
Czech and 38 Slovak districts for the period from 1992 to 1995. The two capitals, Prague and 
Bratislava, are reported as one observation each and migratory flows among the urban districts 
within these two cities are hence not included in the analysis.  
According to the traditional theory of migration (Todaro, 1969), migration should be positively 
related to the expected income differential (wage differential adjusted for the probability of 
finding employment) between the regions of origin and destination. Accordingly, our data should 
reveal a negative relationship between migration and unemployment rate, and a positive 
relationship between migration and wages.  
Table 3 Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration: Czech Republic 
A. Basic Regression Inflow Rate  Outflow Rate Net Inflow Rate 
Constant 0.964 (5.46) 0.893 (5.63) 0.072 (0.55) 
Dummy 93 -0.173 (-3.63) -0.100 (-2.24) -0.073 (-2.58) 
Dummy 94 -0.258 (-5.84) -0.267 (-6.45) 0.009 (0.33) 
Dummy 95 -0.283 (-6.26) -0.301 (-7.29) 0.019 (0.67) 
Unemployment Rate (lagged) -0.037 (-3.87) -0.018 (-1.92) -0.020 (-3.86) 
Wage Ratio (lagged) 0.508 (2.87) 0.418 (2.74) 0.087 (0.70) 
Adj. R2 0.188  0.234  0.068  
B. Extended Regression  Inflow Rate  Outflow Rate Net Inflow Rate 
Constant -0.446 (-0.95) -0.419 (-1.14) -0.030 (-0.09) 
Dummy 93 -0.117 (-2.61) -0.069 (-1.75) -0.048 (-1.76) 
Dummy 94 -0.199 (-4.76) -0.219 (-6.08) 0.021 (0.75) 
Dummy 95 -0.182 (-3.94) -0.219 (-5.66) 0.038 (1.29) 
Unemployment Rate (lagged) -0.006 (-0.56) -0.001 (-0.11) -0.005 (-0.71) 
Wage Ratio (lagged) 1.685 (5.86) 1.567 (6.56) 0.119 (0.71) 
Retirees 0.011 (1.23) -0.002 (-0.29) 0.014 (2.09) 
University Educated -0.019 (-1.62) -0.037 (-3.56) 0.018 (2.06) 
Population Density [log] -0.030 (-0.81) 0.038 (0.96) -0.068 (-2.16) 
Entrepreneurs 0.038 (2.85) 0.035 (3.72) 0.003 (0.45) 
Industrial Employment -0.009 (-3.54) -0.009 (-4.19) 0.000 (0.11) 
Agricultural Employment 0.010 (2.05) 0.016 (3.95) -0.007 (-1.71) 
Adj. R2 0.355  0.441  0.102  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
11 The sources are Pohyb obyvatelstva, Czech Statistical Office, various issues, and Statisticka rocenka 
okresov Slovenskej republiky za roky 1990-1995, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 1997, respectively.  
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Table 3 (continued) Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration: Slovakia 
C. Basic Regression Inflow Rate  Outflow Rate Net Inflow Rate 
Constant -0.040 (-0.19) 0.536 (3.80) -0.579 (-2.97) 
Dummy 93 0.001 (0.02) -0.105 (-3.52) 0.106 (2.98) 
Dummy 94 -0.099 (-2.14) -0.249 (-7.44) 0.149 (4.58) 
Dummy 95 -0.186 (-3.95) -0.305 (-8.89) 0.119 (3.94) 
Unemployment Rate (lagged) -0.004 (-1.30) -0.002 (-0.67) -0.003 (-1.09) 
Wage Ratio (lagged) 0.948 (4.89) 0.386 (3.12) 0.565 (3.14) 
Adj. R2 0.281  0.492  0.196  
D. Extended Regression  Inflow Rate  Outflow Rate Net Inflow Rate 
Constant -0.781 -2.78 0.067 0.28 -0.853 -3.72 
Dummy 93 0.002 0.06 -0.097 -3.83 0.099 3.24 
Dummy 94 -0.104 -2.66 -0.249 -8.49 0.145 5.26 
Dummy 95 -0.192 -4.63 -0.303 -9.84 0.111 4.26 
Unemployment Rate (lagged) -0.003 -0.84 -0.001 -0.37 -0.002 -0.75 
Wage Ratio (lagged) 0.942 4.12 0.567 2.71 0.381 2.11 
Hungarian Minority -0.002 -2.32 -0.004 -5.03 0.001 2.44 
Retirees 0.041 6.96 0.028 5.98 0.013 2.97 
University Educated -0.002 -0.21 -0.026 -3.03 0.024 3.44 
Population Density [log] -0.035 -1.74 0.011 0.64 -0.045 -2.63 
Entrepreneurs 0.056 2.92 0.035 2.38 0.022 2.39 
Industrial Employment -0.004 -2.07 -0.007 -5.15 0.003 2.08 
Agricultural Employment 0.006 2.69 -0.001 -0.42 0.007 3.29 
Adj. R2 0.556  0.656  0.365  
Notes: The data are pooled over 1992-95. T-statistics (heteroscedasticity robust) are reported in parentheses. 
The dependent variables are the gross inflow and outflow rates and the net inflow rate (as percentage of a 
region’s population), respectively. The wage ratio is the average wage divided by the national average wage of 
that year. The unemployment rate and wage ratio are lagged one year. The Hungarian minority is the percentage 
of a district’s population as of 1991. Retirees are the persons above the legally stipulated retirement age 
expressed in percentage of the population as of 1991. University graduates are district’s residents with a 
university degree as percentage of the total population as of 1991. Population Density is the log of persons per 
squared KM. Entrepreneurs are unincorporated entrepreneurs and self-employed persons, excluding farmers, 
expressed in percentage of a district’s population as of 1992. Industrial and agricultural employment are 
expressed in percentage of total employment as of 1992.  
 
We performed the analysis using gross inflow and outflow rates (inflow and outflow divided by 
the district’s population at the end of a year), as well as net inflow rate (net inflow divided by 
population) as the dependent variables. An interpretation of the results using gross migration 
rates is complicated by the fact that inflow and outflow rates are strongly correlated—the 
correlation coefficient across the full data set is 0.89. Hence, if certain variables affect both 
inflows and outflows, the estimated coefficients for the net inflow rate will be biased (see Bauer 
and Zimmerman, 1995). Therefore, we look both at gross as well as net migration flows. The 
results are reported in Table 3.  
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First, we regressed migration on the regional unemployment rate and the ratio of the region’s 
average wage to the national average wage (dividing wages by the respective year’s national 
average wage should remove the effects of nominal wage growth common to all regions), both 
lagged by one year. The regressions also included dummy variables for the individual years 
(1992 being the reference year). The results are reported in Panel A for the Czech Republic and 
in Panel C for Slovakia. Accordingly, unemployment has a significantly negative effect on both 
gross inflows and outflows in the Czech Republic although the effect on inflows is more 
significant and about twice as large as the effect on outflows. The effect on net inflows is 
negative and significant, as expected. Surprisingly, unemployment does not significantly affect 
migration in Slovakia despite higher unemployment and greater regional disparities there. The 
wage ratio has a strong and positive effect on gross inflows and outflows in both countries 
whereas it is only significantly (and positively) related to net inflows in Slovakia.
12
 The effect of 
wages on gross inflows is almost twice as large in Slovakia as in the Czech Republic. Hence, 
it appears that labor mobility in the Czech Republic is driven by regional differences in both 
unemployment and wages whereas in Slovakia it only responds to wage differentials.  
The unemployment rate now comes out clearly insignificant for both countries whereas the 
wage ratio remains significant and retains the sign (although the coefficient estimate more than 
tripled for the Czech Republic). On the other hand, the effect of wages is strong and significant. 
However, wages have a positive effect both on inflows and outflows, which is somewhat 
troubling. The reason might be that due to high migration costs, a large share of those who 
move are high-wage earners. Similarly, the number of entrepreneurs in the regions, standing as 
a proxy for the extent of the emerging private sector, is significantly positively related both to 
inflows and outflows. Again, this perhaps reflects the effect of high migration costs and the fact 
that private sector wages typically exceed those paid in state-owned enterprises. Hence, the 
regions with high wages and/or an active private sector show high mobility in terms of both 
inflows and outflows.  
Several other variables significantly affect migration. The share of the Hungarian minority is 
negatively related to gross inflows and outflows—migration to and from regions with a sizable 
Hungarian population is apparently restricted by linguistic and/or cultural barriers (see also 
Fidrmuc, 1995). Urban regions (those with high population density) experience a net outflow of 
labor. The proportion of university graduates has a particularly strong negative effect on gross 
outflows and a positive effect on net inflows. Industrial regions show lower gross flows, whereas 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
12 Replacing the wage ratio with real wage growth yielded insignificant results. Dividing the unemployment 
rate by the national unemployment rate did not change the results reported above.  
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the opposite is true for agricultural regions (the effect on outflows is insignificant for Slovakia 
though).  
In summary, it appears that the relationship between inter-regional migration and 
unemployment in former Czechoslovakia was weak or non-existent from 1992 to 1995, and 
labor mobility was hence rather ineffective in mitigating adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. 
The effect of migration on unemployment differentials is rather tiny—a rise of the 
unemployment rate by one percentage point leads to a net outflow corresponding to 0.02 
percentage points of the regions population in the Czech Republic and 0.003 percentage points 
in Slovakia (according to the basic regressions reported in Panels A and C). Moreover, the 
effect is stronger in the Czech Republic despite greater need for such adjustments in Slovakia.  
The extent of inter-regional migration was also extremely low: although gross flows were not 
negligible,
13
 the average annual net migration rate was only 0.07 percent in the Czech 
Republic and 0.01 percent in Slovakia. Again, labor mobility was greater in the Czech Republic 
than in Slovakia despite higher unemployment rates and greater need for mitigation of 
asymmetric shocks in the latter country.  
3.4 The Intensity of Bilateral Trade 
The benefits of a single currency rise with the volume of trade. Therefore, countries that trade 
with each other extensively will benefit more from monetary integration. For this reason, the 
intensity of mutual trade is one of the main criteria for assessing the benefits and costs of 
integration (or disintegration). In addition, as Frankel and Rose (1998) argue, high intensity of 
mutual trade increases the correlation of economic shocks between the respective countries. 
Accordingly, countries engaging in mutual trade extensively will also generally fulfill the 
criterion of symmetry of shocks because the latter is in fact endogenous.
14
 
The extent of bilateral trade between the Czech and Slovak Republics has always been 
relatively high. Due to the different sizes of the two republics (the population ratio of the Czech 
Republic to Slovakia is roughly 2:1), Slovakia has been dependent on the Czech Republic to 
much greater extent than vice versa. In 1991, the Czech Republic accounted for some 50 
percent of the Slovak exports and imports. On the other hand, Slovakia accounted for about a 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
13 Gross inflow and outflow rates amounted to , respectively, 1.14 and 1.07 percent in the Czech Republic 
and 0.72 and 0.71 percent in Slovakia.  
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third of Czech trade.
15
 After the break-up, the share of Slovak trade with the Czech Republic 
fell to about 25 percent of the total exports and imports in 1997. Czech trade with Slovakia 
declined to 13 and even 8 percent of total exports and imports in 1997, respectively.  
This points to an extraordinarily high degree of interdependence between the two countries 
prior to the split. Slovakia was the Czech Republic’s most important trading partner and vice 
versa until the split. Such pattern of bilateral trade is rather untypical for two small open 
economies. For example, Norway only accounts for 6 percent of Sweden’s exports—although 
these two countries could be compared with the Czech Republic and Slovakia in terms of 
similarities in culture, language, relative and absolute size, geographical proximity, openness 
and liberalization of mutual trade. The Czech Republic’s share in Slovak exports is similar to, 
for instance, Germany’s share in Dutch exports (28 percent)—even though the Czech 
Republic’s population is twice as large as that of Slovakia whereas the ratio between Germany 
and the Netherlands is 5:1.  
The comparison of Czech-Slovak trade with other countries is difficult because bilateral trade 
depends on the countries’ sizes, distance, and other factors (language). The usual empirical 
approach is to apply the so-called gravity models
16
 (Linnemann, 1966) which relate the trade 
flows between two countries to the importer’s demand, the exporter’s supply, and the trade 
costs. Importer’s demand and exporter’s supply are proxied by the countries’ gross domestic 
products (GDP). Trade costs (transport and transaction costs) are measured by the 
geographical distance.  
Gravity models were used, for example, by Hamilton and Winters (1992) to assess the trade 
potential of Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union). Gravity models were also used 
to analyze the reorientation of trade flows of countries participating in the various economic 
integration arrangements. Abraham, Buyst and Geyssens (1997) apply gravity models to 
historical trade data of Belgium. They show that the creation of the European Community 
reoriented Belgian exports towards the current core countries of the European Union and 
diverted Belgian exports away from trading partners outside the European Union. Cheikbossian 
                                                                                                                                          
14 However, this proposition is subject of controversy. Krugman (1993) argues in favor of the opposite 
relationship—greater integration within monetary unions fosters greater specialization of the regions, thus 
increasing the incidence of asymmetric shocks.  
15 These figures are based on statistics reporting deliveries of Slovak medium and large enterprises 
(enterprises with more than 25 employees) to and from the Czech Republic. Hence, these data are not directly 
comparable with custom statistics on trade flows available since 1993.  
16 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach.  
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and Maurel (1998) estimate gravity models over the period from 1980 to 1993 to analyze the 
disintegration of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). We follow this approach 
and estimate the effects of preferential trade relations between the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia before and after the break-up of Czechoslovakia and compare the specific case of 
former Czechoslovakia with other newly independent states in Eastern Europe. We estimate 
gravity model given as  
M=b1+b2YM+b3YX-b4d+b5CB+b6ENG+b7CS+b8EC+b9V4+b10EA+b11BRU+b12BS+e, (2) 
where M denotes the bilateral imports, Y stands for the GDP of the exporting and the importing 
country (denoted by X and M, respectively), d is the distance between the capital cities of both 
countries, and e is the disturbance term. All variables are in logs. In addition, we included 
dummies which control for the effect of countries sharing a common border (CB), English 
speaking countries (ENG), the European Union (EC), the Visegrád countries (V4), and the 
Europe Agreements between the European Union and the associated countries (EA).17 
Additional dummies measure the effects of preferential trade relations between the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia (CS), Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine (BRU), and the Baltic States 
(BS).  
We estimate (2) on a data set of bilateral trade flows between OECD countries and Eastern 
European countries for each of the seven available years from 1991 to 1997. The results are 
reported in Table 4. This data set provides between 600 and 1200 bilateral trade flows, 
depending on data availability and the creation of new independent states during the analyzed 
period. All data on trade flows and aggregate output are from the IMF (Direction of Trade for 
trade flows and International Financial Statistics for GDP). Missing data on aggregate output in 
some post-communist countries were supplemented from the EBRD Transition Report 1998.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
17 The EC dummy denotes the European Community (12 member states) from 1991 to 1994, and the European 
Union (15 member states) since 1995. The Visegrád group includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia. We do not include the EFTA because its role was largely insignificant during the analyzed period. The 
dummy for Europe Agreements denotes trade flows between the current member states of the European Union 
(including the former EFTA countries) and the associated countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) during the whole analyzed period.  
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Table 4 Gravity Model of Trade Flows 
 1991a 1992a 1993a 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
No. of observations 645 836 1099 1099 1155 1180 1181 1159
Adjusted R2 0.550 0.574 0.598 0.598 0.597 0.590 0.587 0.571
Constant 7.408 5.903 5.604 5.604 5.602 5.209 5.207 5.212
 (11.839) (10.546) (13.137) (13.137) (13.684) (12.464) (12.671) (12.373)
GDP of importing  0.495 0.648 0.620 0.620 0.625 0.611 0.586 0.607
   country (9.763) (16.821) (19.467) (19.466) (19.435) (17.396) (17.580) (16.839)
GDP of exporting  0.533 0.568 0.633 0.633 0.640 0.650 0.650 0.659
   country (10.172) (13.800) (19.293) (19.294) (19.995) (17.745) (18.119) (16.844)
Distance -0.826 -0.787 -0.803 -0.803 -0.819 -0.786 -0.765 -0.777
 (-12.639) (-11.299) (-13.244) (-13.244) (-13.939) (-12.728) (-12.606) (-12.357)
Neighboring  0.707 0.973 1.062 1.062 1.067 0.993 0.982 0.970
   countries (3.019) (4.178) (5.917) (5.917) (6.152) (6.102) (6.205) (5.966)
EC12 or EU15 b 0.915 1.274 1.409 1.409 1.409 1.385 1.385 1.415
 (4.662) (5.699) (6.401) (6.401) (6.281) (8.166) (8.427) (8.311)
English speaking  0.900 1.045 1.272 1.272 1.337 1.563 1.498 1.547
   countries (3.676) (4.687) (6.137) (6.137) (6.414) (7.861) (7.243) (7.673)
Visegrád countries  -0.846 -0.498 -0.613 -0.613 -0.396 -0.042 0.039 0.180
 (-4.110) (-2.874) (-2.418) (-2.418) (-1.606) (-0.213) (0.186) (0.807)
Europe  -0.933 -0.551 -0.466 -0.466 -0.344 -0.013 0.110 0.167
   Agreements (-4.949) (-3.191) (-3.630) (-3.630) (-2.728) (-0.110) (0.930) (1.382)
Former  2.760 2.690 2.520 2.626 2.086 1.988 1.832 1.702
   Czechoslovakia (10.566) (10.175) (10.430) (10.765) (8.915) (11.112) (9.557) (7.411)
Baltic States 1.175 1.175 0.870 1.204 1.229 1.302
 (3.456) (3.456) (2.467) (4.355) (4.741) (4.326)
Belarus, Russia,  1.780 1.780 2.337 1.675 1.512 1.445
   and Ukraine (5.488) (5.488) (8.162) (7.491) (6.933) (5.666)
Notes: The covariance matrices of the coefficients are corrected for possible 
heteroscedasticity. T-statistics in parentheses.  a We use estimates for trade flows between 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia based on enterprise delivery statistics for 1991-1993, and 
customs statistics for 1993-1997, thus yielding two estimates for 1993.  b The European 
Community (12 member states) during 1991-94, and the European Union after 1995 (15 
member states). c The Visegrád group includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia. 
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Figure 1 The Effects of Preferential Trade Relations between the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia  











Note: The solid line shows the development of the coefficient estimated for former Czechoslovakia as defined 
by equation (2). The confidence bands (dotted lines) were computed as the estimated coefficient ± standard 
errors. The covariance matrices of the coefficients are corrected for possible heteroscedasticity. The 
discontinuity in 1993 is caused by the fact that we used two different data sources, the coefficients for 1991-
93 are estimated using  enterprise data (see the text for more details), whereas the coefficients for 1993-97 
are estimated using  the official trade statistics (hence we have two estimates for 1993).  
 
The bilateral trade flows between the Czech Republic and Slovakia were not officially reported 
before the break-up. Therefore, we estimate the trade flows for the two years before the break-
up and for the first post break-up year (i.e. 1991-93), using the data on enterprise deliveries 
between the two entities.
18
 Two caveats relate to the use of these data. First, the data are 
based on enterprise reports, not customs statistics. Second, the data only include deliveries of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
18 The source of the data is: Vzajomne dodavky medzi SR a CR: 1.-4. stvrtrok 1992, Statistical Office of the 
Slovak Republic, 1993; and Predaj tovarov medzi SR a CR v roku 1993 podla stvrtrokov, Statistical Office of the 
Slovak Republic, 1994. 
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enterprises with at least 25 employees. Therefore, the results obtained through these data and 
the official statistics are not directly comparable. Nonetheless, we believe it is instructive to 
use the data to estimate the effects of preferential trade relations pre break-up. Moreover, the 
estimates for 1993, which were obtained with both types of data(see Figure 1), and not 
significantly different.  
As in previous studies, gravity models provide an extraordinarily good explanation for bilateral 
trade between the selected countries (with`R2 between 0.5 and 0.6). All the newly independent 
countries in Eastern Europe trade more intensively with their previous counterparts than with 
other countries. The estimated coefficient for former Czechoslovakia was 2.76 in 1991. This 
implies (after a transformation of the logs to absolute levels) that the trade flows within 
Czechoslovakia exceeded the ‘normal’ level (i.e. trade in absence of any preferential relations) 
nearly 16 times. Moreover, this factor seemed to be relatively stable until the division of 
Czechoslovakia in 1993. The demise of the common state caused a sharp decline of bilateral 
trade (see Figure 1). The coefficient for former Czechoslovakia fell to 2.09 (corresponding to a 
trade volume that was still eight times higher than the normal level) in 1994 and finally to only 
1.70 (about five times the normal level) in 1997.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that the trade intensity as measured by the estimated 
coefficient for trade relations between the Czech Republic and Slovakia has been declining 
continuously since 1993, although the bilateral trade volume recovered slightly between 1993 
(minimum value) and 1997. This, together with the declining shares of the intra-Czechoslovak 
trade in the countries’ total trade, shows that trade growth consisted of three components in 
recent years: First, the trade intensity declined in the wake of the disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia. Second, the trade level increased reflecting high growth especially in Slovakia 
in recent years. Finally, the reduction of trade barriers between the Visegrád countries (Poland, 
former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) which were reflected in negative coefficients for the 
Visegrád group until 1996, increased trade between these countries (including Czech and 
Slovak trade). However, the role of the last effect was relatively minor.  
Fidrmuc (1999c) argues that the customs union between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is 
largely comparable to trade liberalization within the European Union. Actually, the coefficient for 
former Czechoslovakia seems to converge to the trade level in the European Union. In 1997, 
trade between two EU countries was more than four times higher than normal trade. Fidrmuc 
(1999c) suggests that the trade intensity between the Czech Republic and Slovakia could 
stabilize at about this level if no further relaxation of economic relations takes place. On the 
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other hand, a further decline of bilateral trade intensity could be expected if the customs union 
is dissolved, for example, because of the accession of the Czech Republic to the European 
Union and the exclusion of Slovakia from the first wave of the Eastward enlargement of the EU.  
Furthermore, we can see that the trade relations between the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
have been more intense than those between Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine, or the Baltic 
States. Similarly, as in the case of former Czechoslovakia, the trade intensity between 
Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine is falling rapidly to about the level of the EU trade intensity 
while trade among the Baltic States is relatively stable at a much lower level. 
3.5 The Diversification of the Industrial Structure  
Kenen (1969) argues that for a well-diversified economy the importance of asymmetric shocks 
will be much smaller than for a less-diversified economy. “From the standpoint of external 
balance, taken by itself, economic diversification, reflected in export diversification, serves, ex 
ante, to forestall the need for frequent changes in the terms of trade and therefore, for frequent 
changes in national exchange rates.” (p. 49). Thus, fixed rates are “most appropriate—or least 
inappropriate—to well-diversified economies.” In other words, if output and exports of a country 
are sufficiently diversified, then shocks affecting specific industries will not have an equally 
profound effect on the economy as a whole. On the other hand, should exports be heavily 
biased towards certain industries, then shocks affecting these industries will also have a 
significant effect on the overall business cycle of the country. This, in turn, increases the 
incidence of asymmetric shocks within the monetary union. 
The structures of output in the Czech Republic and Slovakia do not appear dramatically 
different from each other. Manufacturing is the most important category (besides services) 
accounting for about a quarter of the output. Table 5 reports commodity structures of Czech 
and Slovak foreign trade. Manufacturing (SITC categories 6, 7 and 8) accounts for the greatest 
part of exports: 70 percent of the Czech exports and 64 percent of the Slovak exports. 
However, the Slovak exports are more biased towards manufactured products with relatively low 
value-added (SITC 6). On the other hand, machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) 
dominate the Czech exports. On the import side, SITC 7 is relatively more important for the 
Czech Republic whereas Slovakia has a greater share of mineral fuels (SITC 3). The 
commodity structure of bilateral trade between the two countries is not much different from 
their overall export patterns.  
Table 5 Commodity Structure of Czech and Slovak Foreign Trade, 1993 
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  Czech Republic Slovakia Bilateral Trade 
Category Exports Imports Exports Imports CZ->SK SK->CZ 
SITC0 Food & Animals 6.5% 6.3% 5.5% 7.3% 7.6% 5.5% 
SITC1 Beverages & Tabacco 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 1.5% 2.5% 1.4% 
SITC2 Crude Materials excl. Fuels 6.1% 5.0% 4.9% 5.2% 2.2% 4.3% 
SITC3 Mineral Fuels & Related 6.2% 11.1% 4.9% 20.9% 10.2% 6.6% 
SITC4 Animal & Vegetable Oils 0.2% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
SITC5 Chemicals 9.5% 12.1% 12.0% 11.4% 12.3% 14.4% 
SITC6 Manufactured Goods 29.9% 15.9% 38.8% 15.1% 25.1% 34.0% 
SITC7 Machinery & Transport Equip. 27.6% 36.1% 19.4% 29.3% 27.3% 23.8% 
SITC8 Misc. Manufactured Articles 12.7% 11.7% 13.4% 9.0% 12.3% 9.8% 
SITC9 Others 0.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 
Sources: Czech Statistical Office and Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. 
CZ->SK refers to Czech Exports to Slovakia; SK->CZ indicates Slovak exports to the Czech 
Republic. 
 
However, while the structure of output appears similar at aggregate level, there were more 
differences at disaggregate level. In particular, large parts of Slovak industry were build only 
after the communist takeover in 1948—within the policy of industrialization of Slovakia. The 
Slovak industry was hence much more affected by the communist political objectives, in 
particular their emphasis on heavy engineering, metallurgy, and chemical industry—see 
Pavlinek (1995), p. 358, and Capek and Sazama (1993), p. 214. As a result, Slovakia was 
more dependent on trade with the member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), and thus was more adversely affected by the collapse of the CMEA trade. 
In 1991, the shares of exports to the CMEA and the EU were 42 and 34 percent, respectively, 
compared to 35 and 43 percent for the Czech Republic (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 1997, p. 194).  
The Slovak industry had more  concentrated on the production of military-equipment. This was 
particularly important, since the output of this industry in Czechoslovakia fell by 85 percent 
between 1987 and 1992. This decline again affected Slovakia dis-proportionately. Whereas 
Slovakia produced 60 percent of the Czechoslovak military-equipment in 1987, its share fell to 
40 percent by 1992.
19
 Finally, the Slovak industry was strongly regionally concentrated—
enterprises were on average larger and often presented the dominant source of regional 
employment.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
19 Dedek et al. (1995), p.56 and Kiss (1993), p. 1046. According to Kiss, the military industry accounted for 3 
percent of the Czechoslovak GDP and 10.5 percent of the industrial output in 1987.  
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In summary, the output and foreign trade of the Czech Republic and Slovakia seemed 
sufficiently diversified and the exports of both countries showed a similar commodity structure. 
However, Slovakia’s greater dependence on heavy industry and military-equipment production, 
as well as its greater orientation towards the CMEA may have been sources of asymmetric 
developments, in particular during the economic transition in the early 1990s.  
4. Benefits and Costs of the Break-up  
The break-up of Czechoslovakia was undoubtedly costly in the short run. As our discussion in 
Section 3.4 illustrates, the trade between the Czech Republic and Slovakia declined 
substantially after 1993 even though they retained a customs union. Moreover, the two new 
countries had to bear the one-time costs of creating new government institutions, currency 
separation and conversion, setting up a new border and so on. Sujan and Sujanova (1994) 
estimate that the break-up reduced the Czech GDP by 2.2 percentage points during the first 
half of 1993.
20
 The effect on Slovakia was certainly even greater, as many of the costs of 
independence were not related to country size. Overall, Slovakia’s GDP fell by four percent 
during 1993 whereas Czech GDP fell by one percent.  
An important aspect related to the benefits and costs of Czechoslovakia’s break-up is the 
question of fiscal transfers. Fiscal transfers generally serve two purposes: redistribution (or 
equalization of per-capita incomes) and risk sharing. The latter type of fiscal transfers is 
particularly important when unions are exposed to asymmetric output shocks. Von Hagen 
(1998) surveys empirical literature on intra-national fiscal transfers and shows that both types 
of transfers are substantial in size in the developed countries studied. Throughout 
Czechoslovakia’s post-war history, Slovakia was the receiver of net transfers from the Czech 
Republic—mainly via redistribution of federal tax revenue. However, the exact size of the 
transfer has never been officially reported.
21
 The available estimates of the size of the transfer 
in 1992 range from CSK 13.5 billion (Hajek et al., 1993) to CSK 25 billion (OECD, 1994), or 4.4 
and 8 percent of the Slovak GDP, respectively. Hajek et al. also estimate the net transfer for 
1990 and 1991 at CSK 3.8 and 7.7 billion, or 1.5 and 2.6 percent of the Slovak GDP, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
20 The overall decline was 0.5 percent, the other factors which they identify and their contributions were as 
follows: world recession (-2.1%), inflow of FDI (+2.7%), export growth (+3.1%), restrictive fiscal policy (-1.3%), 
and other factors (-0.2%).  
21 In Czechoslovakia, the federal government collected most of tax revenue and in turn redistributed it to the 
two republics. This makes any estimation of the extent of transfers a very complicated task.  
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respectively.
22
 Moreover, additional transfers could have been caused by the fact that the 
prices were not the result of market clearing but were set centrally.
 23
  
Fiscal transfers were an important source of equalization of per-capita income within the former 
federation—if the Slovak per-capita NMP amounted to 64 percent of the Czech level in 1950, it 
already accounted for 88 percent in 1989. The gap was much smaller according to the 
disposable NMP—the corresponding figures are 81 and 92 percent —a fact which again 
highlights the importance of transfers.  
These numbers suggest that fiscal transfers in former Czechoslovakia primarily served the 
purpose of redistribution, and not of risk sharing. This is also supported by the comparison of 
correlation coefficients estimated for the NMP and the disposable NMP (Table 1). While the 
estimates of correlation of permanent shocks do not differ much for the NMP and the 
disposable NMP, the estimated correlation of temporary shocks is generally lower for the 
disposable NMP (except for the last sub-period). On the other hand, the figures estimated by 
Hajek et al. (1993) indicate a considerable increase in the size of the net transfer since the 
start of the transition. This occurred apparently in response to higher costs of reforms incurred 
by Slovakia—thus suggesting that risk sharing became more important after the collapse of the 
communist regime.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the direction fiscal transfer flows was always from the Czech 
Republic to Slovakia raises an important issue. If transfers are to serve effectively as an 
insurance, they have to sum up to zero in net present value in the long run. Otherwise, the 
insurance mechanism is not actuarially fair, and the net payer has to reap additional economic 
or political benefits in order to find it attractive to remain in the union.
24
  
The reasons for sustaining such a non-zero-sum arrangement were clearly political during the 
communist period. Indeed, equalization of per-capita incomes was part of the official policy of 
the communist governments. On the other hand, sustaining the union became politically 
difficult after the collapse of communism, as the Slovak political representation sought to 
reassert itself and pushed for increased autonomy. Indeed, the split of the federation removed 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
22 Krovak and Zamrazilova (1990) attempt to quantify the size of this transfer for 1950-88. According to their 
estimates, the average transfer was some 14 percent of Slovak disposable NMP during 1950s and 1960s and 10 
percent during 1970s and 1980s. However, their methodology probably significantly overestimates the size of the 
transfer. In particular, they disregard the effects of Czech-Slovak bilateral trade and the borrowing by the federal 
government, and attribute a lion’s share of the contribution of Czechoslovak foreign trade to the Czech NMP.  
23 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this point.  
24 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this point.  
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an important source of political instability which eventually paid off for the Czech Republic as it 
facilitated its inclusion in the first group of candidates for the EU enlargement and the entry to 
the NATO. Slovakia, on the other hand, reverted to nationalism, corruption and authoritarian 
policies, and thus excluded itself (for the time being) from accession negotiations with the EU, 
as well as from the NATO enlargement.  
Given the non-zero-sum nature of the fiscal transfer flows, the break-up was economically more 
advantageous for the Czech Republic. Drèze (1993) proposes a procedure for dismantling 
unions in a way that is distributionally neutral. Accordingly, the net payer should pay an exit 
fee equal to the present value of future transfers to the other region at the time of the break-up. 
However, a different procedure was applied for breaking up Czechoslovakia. Essentially, 
liabilities of the federal state were divided 2:1 (population ratio) between the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia. Immovable assets were taken over by the country in which they were located 
whereas other assets were also divided according to the population ratio. By seceding, the 
Czech Republic has gained—and Slovakia has lost—the value of the implicit liability to 
continue the transfers in future.  
Cessation of the transfers after the break-up of the political union essentially sealed the fate of 
the monetary union. In the absence of fiscal transfers and with the falling bilateral trade, the 
continuing economic decline and the persisting unemployment differences between the two 
republics, a monetary union would have been costly for Slovakia even in the short run. 
Therefore, expectations arose that Slovakia would have to resort to monetary policy to counter 
the adverse economic developments. That indeed happened in June 1993 when the Slovak 
currency was devaluated by ten percent. Thus, the absence of transfers made the monetary 
union unstable, increasing the need for exchange-rate adjustments and fueling speculations 
that eventually brought down the common currency. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we attempted to answer the question whether (or not) Czechoslovakia was an 
optimum currency area. However, the answer to this question is a matter of degree. We argued 
that permanent and temporary shocks to output were positively correlated in Czechoslovakia 
during the pre-reform period, although the correlation of permanent shocks appeared not to be 
particularly high when compared to other existing monetary unions. We also showed evidence 
pointing to profound regional asymmetries—in particular in unemployment—after the reforms 
had got under way. We highlighted some potential sources of such asymmetries—different 
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industrial structures in the two countries and greater dependence of Slovakia on trade with the 
former Soviet Union. We argued that labor mobility was low and ineffective in mitigating the 
adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. We showed evidence that the break-up was costly in 
the short run—as reflected by a temporary fall in economic activity—and in the long run—in 
terms of lost trade between the two successor countries.  
Clearly, the economic problems that struck Czechoslovakia were not insurmountable. Regional 
disparities could have been smoothed by measures aimed at increasing labor mobility, by 
means aimed at increased fiscal flows or by region-specific policies. However, the political 
commitment necessary to undertake such measures was lacking in 1992. Moreover, the 
Czech Republic stood to gain economically—by ceasing to pay fiscal transfers to Slovakia—
and politically—by severing itself from the politically unstable and unpredictable ‘younger 
brother.’ Large parts of the Slovak population, on the other hand, apparently attributed a 
significant intrinsic value to independence as such. In the end, Czechoslovakia and 
subsequently the Czech-Slovak monetary union broke up despite the costs and amidst little 
political protests in either the Czech Lands or Slovakia.  
So is there a moral to this story? Are there any lessons from the break-up of both 
Czechoslovakia and the monetary union between the Czech Republic and Slovakia for stability 
of other monetary unions—the EMU in particular?  
One way to interpret the disintegration of Czechoslovakia is to explain it as the result of the 
strive of the Slovak people for an independent nation state. The break-up of Czechoslovakia, 
then, would appear more-or-less a historical necessity which occurred in 1993 because the 
demise of the communist regime removed the political constraints that prevented it from 
happening earlier. Czechoslovakia, accordingly, broke up despite considerable economic, 
social and demographic convergence and regardless of the economic rationale. The lesson to 
draw from the split of Czechoslovakia then would be rather bleak for other unions—it would 
seem that nationalism prevails over economics. The days of countries such as Belgium and 
Canada may thus be counted and the EMU might be a futile enterprise.  
However, while the political preferences in the Czech Republic and Slovakia clearly diverged in 
the 1992 election, there is evidence that this was in fact motivated by economic differences 
between the two regions. Fidrmuc (1999a) argues that the different patterns of voters’ support 
for continued economic reforms reflected the unequal distribution of costs and benefits of the 
reform. Accordingly, even though the immediate reason for the break-up of Czechoslovakia was 
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a political conflict, the conflict itself was in turn engendered by economic differences between 
the two regions.  
Being economists, we want to pursue a different interpretation. Even if the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia was motivated politically or just by nationalist feelings, there was little to gain 
from the break-up of the monetary union. Therefore, given that the monetary union failed, we 
should be able to find some economic reasons underlying its collapse, and, in turn, also the 
disintegration of Czechoslovakia.  
Low correlation of permanent shocks pre-reform was a potential source of instability and 
pressure for exchange rate adjustment—in case a sufficiently large asymmetric permanent 
shock occurred. The economic transition that started in 1991 had substantial long-lasting 
asymmetric effects, as it turned out much more costly in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. 
Labor mobility proved ineffective in mitigating the adverse effects of reform-induced shocks. 
Fiscal transfers were insufficient to equilibrate the shocks and became increasingly politically 
costly over time. Eventually, Czechoslovakia broke up and the Czech-Slovak monetary union 
(CSMU) was conceived as an a-priori transitory arrangement. Since the CSMU had even fewer 
means to absorb the adverse effects of asymmetric shocks, it is no wonder that it collapsed 
within five weeks.  
Moreover, the CSMU failed because its design was fundamentally flawed. Besides the lack of 
political commitment and the absence of fiscal transfers, the union’s sustainability was 
undermined by its low credibility and low exit costs. The monetary union did not have a single 
monetary authority but instead monetary policy was decided and coordinated by the Monetary 
Committee which was composed of representatives of the two national central banks. Clearly, 
the national representatives were charged with pursuing the interests of their own country not 
those of the union. Implementation of policy decisions was also up to the national banks. This 
greatly undermined the credibility of the monetary union. Low credibility in turn induced 
substantial speculative transactions. Given the general lack of political commitment to sustain 
the common currency in the long or even medium term, these speculations brought the 
monetary union down in a matter of weeks.  
The disintegration of Czechoslovakia caused a significant decline of trade between the new 
successor countries. The bilateral trade volume declined from nearly a 16 fold of the ‘normal’ 
level estimated by gravity models to only its five-fold value. However, much of this decline 
reflected only the fall in the relative importance of bilateral trade in the wake of a growth in trade 
with third countries, in particular the European Union. The trade lost in the bilateral relationship 
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was quickly diverted elsewhere. Hence, the overall economic cost of breaking up was not 
particularly high.  
The temptation to secede is higher if the expected exit cost—the decline of trade with the rest 
of the union members and the cost of independence (introducing new government institutions, 
currency, enforcing borders)—is small. The ease with which the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
introduced national currencies just five weeks after the demise of the political union illustrates 
this point. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the incremental costs of abandoning the common 
currency were relatively small and thus failed to serve as a deterrent to further disintegration.  
The break-up of Czechoslovakia demonstrates the crucial importance of political commitment 
for the stability of monetary unions. It also shows that the political commitment can dissipate 
quickly in the wake of extraordinary asymmetric economic developments and in the absence of 
effective mechanisms for the absorption of such shocks. The experience of other countries that 
struggle with regional disparities, such as Belgium or Italy, appears consistent with this point. 
From this perspective, it is worrying that the EMU was conceived without the individual 
countries attributing much attention to the question of economic costs and benefits. The EMU 
may be beneficial for the core countries—Germany, France, Austria and the Benelux—but may 
prove costly for the countries, economies of which are not so closely integrated with the core. 
It is also worrying that the EMU does not provide for sufficient mechanisms to deal effectively 
with the adverse effects of asymmetric shocks. Moreover, the Maastricht rules on public debt 
and government deficit effectively restrict the ability of participating countries to use fiscal 
policy to deal with asymmetric shocks. Then, although the political commitment for the EMU is 
high at present, it can plummet dramatically in case of a major recession affecting only a part 
of the union.  
Finally, the case of Czechoslovakia shows that while the formation of a monetary union is a 
tedious job of many years, its dissolution can occur quickly and does not need to be very 
costly. Thus, the concerns that the costs of dissolving the future monetary union in Europe will 
be high do not seem to be necessarily warranted. On the contrary, the costs of the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia and the dissolution of the monetary union were relatively low, even in the short-
run. It seems that in the world of free trade, small countries benefit and the importance of 
political boundaries declines. 
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